\\TL;DR:\\ Figure Technology ($FIGR) is the #1 home equity lender in America and 65% of its volume now runs through a marketplace where it doesn't source the borrower, doesn't fund the loan, and doesn't take the credit risk. It just collects a toll. Q2 volume +132% YoY, adjusted EBITDA margin 54.6% (Rule of 150 growth), EPS $0.35 vs \~$0.23 expected. Stock closed yesterday at $35.67, down 54% from its January high of $78. My model says $58 present-value fair, $106 terminal. Four analysts cover this thing. \\Positions at the bottom.\\
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\## The setup nobody is looking at
Figure was founded by Mike Cagney and June Ou — the guy who founded SoFi and the woman who was its CTO. They spent six years building an automated home-equity origination stack on their own blockchain (Provenance) and got the process from \\\~6 weeks and $11,000 down to under 7 days and $1,000.\\
That's the whole moat. Everything else follows from it.
Result: Figure did \\$12.34B of originations TTM.\\ Bank of America did $10.4B in \all of 2025.\ A fintech nobody covers is the largest home equity lender in the United States and it isn't close. Rule of 150 economics has only PLTR and MU ahead of it.
\## The part the market hasn't repriced
Here's what actually changed. Figure Connect launched in June 2024. Partners source the borrower and originate against \\presold commitments from institutional buyers.\\ Figure provides the underwriting and distribution rails and takes a marketplace fee of roughly 3%.
Read that again. \\Presold.\\ The buyer is committed before the loan exists. Figure isn't warehousing it, isn't marketing for the borrower, isn't holding the credit.
Connect volume: \\$8M in Q4'24 → $1.6B in Q1'26 → $2.773B in Q2'26.\\ From nothing to two-thirds of the business in seven quarters.
| | Q2'25 | Q2'26 |
|---|---|---|
| Connect % of volume | 41.7% | \\65.1%\\ |
| Partner-branded volume | 76.6% | \\83.0%\\ |
| Active partners | — | \\489\\ (\~390 in Q1, +102 in Q2) |
| Loan inventory | 31 days | \\16 days\\ |
| Ops cost per $ of volume | 79bps | \\67bps\\ |
| Adj. EBITDA margin | 47.2% | \\54.6%\\ |
\### The three things a lender does that Figure increasingly doesn't
\\1. Pay to acquire the borrower.\\ 83% of volume now arrives partner-branded. Figure isn't buying those leads. Connect volume scales with essentially zero incremental CAC — which is why marketing grew 81% while volume grew 132%.
\\2. Fund the loan.\\ $1.285B of committed warehouse capacity, \\$104.9M drawn. 8.2%.\\ That is 2.5% of one quarter's volume. They pushed $4.26B through a balance sheet they are barely touching, and inventory turns in 16 days instead of 31.
\\3. Eat the credit risk.\\ Securitization collateral grew \\68%\\ last half. Figure's maximum disclosed exposure to those vehicles grew \\28%.\\ The exposure ratio went from \\7.57% to 5.75%\\ — the book doubled and their skin in it \shrank\. Plus 30+ unaffiliated securitization buyers, \~15 of them AAA-mandate accounts, 17+ rated deals, \~70% repeat.
\### What that does to the income statement
This is the tell. From FY23 to FY25, \\revenue grew 142% against 18% cost growth.\\ Incremental EBITDA margins ran \\82% in 2024 and 91% in 2025.\\ Adjusted EBITDA margin went from \\negative 4% to 54.6%.\\ Management is targeting \\60% by 2028\\ and at this trajectory that's conservative.
And the mix is visibly rotating inside the revenue line. \\Ecosystem and technology fees — the marketplace/platform line — grew +159% YoY while total revenue grew +113%.\\ They've gone from 5% of revenue in FY23 to \\32.3% today.\\ The high-margin line is compounding roughly 1.4x faster than the business it sits inside.
\### So price it
Everything above is an argument about \\which comp set this belongs in.\\ That's the whole trade. Here's the table:
| Comp set | Multiple | FY26E EBITDA \~$499M | Implied share pr